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I. Introduction
The Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations,I which has been
negotiated in UN bodies for the past ten years, has been the subject of
much commentary.2 While not yet a binding structure of international law,
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1. The latest draft is dated June 2, 1983. See U.N. ESCOR Doc. E/C.10/1983/S/5.
2. See generally LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT (N. Horn ed. 1980); Hail-
bronner, Voelkerrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Veberlegungen zu Verhaltenskodizes fuer
Transnationale Unternehmen, in FESTSCHRIFT FUER HANS-JUERGEN SCHLOCHAUER ZUM
75. GEBURTSTAG 329 (1981); Schaffner, Die Internationalen Gesellschaften: Von den
Polemischen Kampagnen zum Internationalen Verhaltenskodex, in UNTERNEHMER-TRAE-
GER DER ZUKUNFT 175 (W. Wittmann ed. 1981); Boeckstiegel & Catranis, Verhaltenskodex
der Vereinten Nationen fiter Multinationale Unternehmen: Illusion oder Absehbare Reali-
taet?, 1980 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJWI 1823; Fatouros, Le Projet de Code
International de Conduite sur les Entreprises Transnationales: Essai Pr~liminaire d'Eval-
uation, 107 J. DR. INT'L 5 (1980); Fikentscher, United Nations Codes of Conduct: New
Paths in International Law, 30 AM. J. CoMP. L. 577 (1982); Garelli, Perspectives et Structures
d'un Code de Conduite des Nations Unies sur les Socites Transnationales, 3 REVUE ECON-
OMIQUE ET SOCIALE 145 (1977); Gross, Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 16
J. WORLD TR. L. 414 (1982); Kukat, Verhaltenskodizex fuer Multinationale Unternehmen,
1979 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 293; Sanders, Implementing In-
ternational Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 241 (1982);
Sanders, The Implementation of International Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enter-
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the Code of Conduct nevertheless has had an important impact on the
development of crossborder direct investments because negotiating par-
ties are finding it increasingly difficult to accept either the law of the
investor or the law of the host country. The Peoples' Republic of China
is a good example of the development of the foreign investment regulations
because only recently, due to the opening up of Chinese foreign policy,
has the PRC begun to develop a legal framework for cooperation with
foreign firms. The Code of Conduct can in that respect be a framework
for the negotiation of an international investment contract, since it allows
the negotiating parties to find an internationally acceptable frame for the
drafting of that contract. The impact of the Code of Conduct cannot be
evaluated without a review of the historical development of foreign direct
investment in less developed countries since 1945.
II. Foreign Direct Investment in Less
Developed Countries (LDCs) Since 1945
As a result of the decolonization process, foreign direct investment
predominated in the less developed countries during the first twenty-five
years after the end of the Second World War. Exceptions like Tanzania,
where the former colonial monopoly of the Lonrho Group was trans-
formed into the "para-statal" National Development Corporation due to
the Arusha Declaration of President Nyerere of 1967, 3 showed no en-
couraging results in the long run.
The misuse of power and the interference of some transnational cor-
porations with the national economic policy of less developed countries,
such as in Chile, 4 led to the development of a Code of Conduct within
the United Nations family. It derived from discussion within the OECD
concerning the potential for powerful transnational corporations to evade
national regulations. The United Nations Declarations in 1974 on the
prises, 28 NETHERLANDS INT'L L.R. 318 (1981); Schetting, UNO-Verhaltenskodex filer
Transnationale Unternehmen, 1983 RIW 287; Steeg, Internationale Verhaltensregeln fuer
Internationale Investitionen und Multinationale Unternehmen, 1985 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER UN-
TERNEHMENS UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] I; Studier, Verhaltenskodizes fuer Multi-
nationale Konzerne und die Interessen Position der Entwicklungslaender, 1978 VERFASSUNG
UND RECHT IN UEBERSEE 411; Wellens, Transnational Corporations: UN Involvement To-
wards a Code of Conduct, 21 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 442 (1978); Comment, The United Nations
Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 273 (1977).
3. J. NYERERE, UHURU NA UJAMAA-FREEDOM AND SOCIALISM-SELECTIONS FROM
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 1965-1967 (1968).
4. Behrens, Rechtsfragen im Chilenischen Kupferstreit, 37 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUER
AUSLAENDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 394 (1973); Seidl-
Hohenveldern, Die Verstaatlichung von Kupferbergbaubetrieben in Chile, 1974 RIW 421;
Wehser, Voelkerrechtswidrige Verstaatlichung der Kupferminen in Chile, 1974 JURISTEN-
ZEITUNG [JZ] 117.
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Establishment of a New International Economic Order 5 and the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States6 were the basis for the United
Nations Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations.
Parallel to this development ran expanding capital transfer to developing
countries, caused by the first oil price explosion in 1973 and the recycling
of petrodollars through private banks. The excess liquidity, lent by the
OPEC states on a short-term basis, was transferred to the less developed
countries on a roll-over basis of from three to six months and a linkage
to LIBOR7 plus a spread for the risk of the credit facility. The excessive
liquidity in petrodollars was a supply that found relatively small demand
and resulted in relatively low interest rates until 1978. The devaluation
of the U.S. dollar during the Carter administration and the tight-fisted
policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board to control inflation induced
the increase of the U.S. dollar and interest rates. The policy impact of
the 1970s against foreign direct investment in developing countries and
the low interest rates led to excessive borrowing by developing countries
and the substitution of internal investment streams by external transfers
of resources via the market (imports of goods, services, and technology).
The increase of the interest rates at the end of the 1970s and the sub-
sequent rise of the U.S. dollar have seriously exacerbated the balance of
payment problems in the developing countries. Decreasing terms of trade
due to diminished income from the export of raw materials caused the de
facto default of many developing countries. Mexico was the first large
debtor country to apply for the support of the International Monetary
Fund to adjust her economic policy in 1982. Today the International,Mon-
etary Fund is negotiating the external debt problem with more than sixty-
two countries after having alleviated the situation in Argentina and Brazil.
Mexico is at the brink a second time because falling oil prices and a
natural catastrophe-a serious earthquake-have seriously stressed the
Mexican economy.
The previous policy of the International Monetary Fund of restructuring
and financing, i.e., reduction of imports and increasing exports, can only
be successful if the additional fresh money to finance the necessary struc-
tural adaptation can be channeled into the growth areas of the national
economy. Despite this fact, the credits of private banks in industrialized
countries can no longer be considerably enhanced due to the severe risk
of transferring hard currency. The same is true for public development aid.
A developing country may also come close to its limits in attempting to
achieve import substitution. The country faces the danger that it may cut
5. Dated May 1, 1974, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974).
6. Dated Dec. 12, 1974, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975).
7 London Interbank Offered Rate.
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the supply lines for necessary technological goods that are the prerequisite
for further development. An export orientation is therefore the only suit-
able remedy for less developed countries to service their foreign debt.
In this situation foreign direct investment has regained importance. The
LDCs have already begun to reconsider their previous negative attitude
toward foreign risk capital. 8 They have recognized that foreign direct
investment is an appropriate way to overcome the debt crisis. Compared
to commercial credits, foreign direct investment has the advantage that
no interest must be paid and that profit must only be transferred when it
has actually been gained and not been reinvested. Moreover, foreign direct
investment creates new jobs, increases the transfer of technology and
provides, therefore, professional education and the development of the
work force. 9 It has spillover and growth effects for the whole economy.
Consequently, the plan of the U.S. Secretary of Treasury, James Baker,
presented at the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund in
Seoul in October 1985, envisions an increase in the stream of foreign
direct investment to the developing countries parallel to the external trans-
fer of resources via fresh money. 10 The present strategy of adaptation will
be enriched by growth-oriented elements. II The latest financial package
for Mexico is a first test for this new strategy.12
III. Prerequisites for Foreign Direct Investment in LDCs
A. THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION
The world economy today is concentrated in three major regions: the
United States of America, Japan, and Western Europe. Together with the
8. Braun, Veraenderte Einstellung der Entwicklungslaender zu Auslandsinvestitionen?,
in ZIELSETZUNG PARTNERSCHAFT, DIE WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHE BEDEUTUNG VON Aus-
LANDSINVESTITIONEN UND TECHNOLOGIETRANSFER 289 (Draeger Stiftung ed. 1985) [here-
inafter ZIELSETZUNG PARTNERSCHAFT]; Kuhn, Neubesinnung der Entwicklungslaender
gegenueber Auslandsinvestitionen, in ZIELSETZUNG PARTNERSCHAFT, supra, at 229.
9. Steeg, Internationale Verhaltensregeln fuer Internationale investitionen und Multi-
nationale Unternehmen, 1985 ZGR 1.
10. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 101 (Apr. 1986);
Duwendag, "Baker-Plan": Absicherung gegen Kapitalflucht?, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER DAS
GESAMTE KREDITWESEN 10 (1986); Herlt, Der Baker-Plan zur Loesung der Internationalen
Schuldenkrise, 1986 EUROPAARCHIV 161; Gemischte Reaktionen auf Bakers Vorschlaege,
Neue Zuercher Zeitung [NZZ] No. 235, Oct. 10, 1985, at 17; Wachstumsorientierte Schul-
deninitiative Bakers, NZZ No. 234, Oct. 9, 1985, at 17.
II. C. EBENROTH, CODE OF CONDUCT-ANSAETZE ZUR VERTRAGLICHEN GESTALTUNG
INTERNATIONALER INVESTITIONEN 108-121 (1987); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 101 (Apr. 1986).
12. C. EBENROTH, supra note II, 117-121; Zwiespaeltige Rezepte fuer Mexiko's
Schuldentrauma, NZZ No. 176, Aug. 2-3, 1986, at 13; Weltbank-Kredite an Mexiko mit
Vorbehalten, NZZ No. 175, July 31, 1986, at 13; Mexiko signiert "Letter of Intent" an den
IMF, NZZ No. 168, July 23, 1986, at 13.
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so-called "Newly Industrialized Countries" (NICs) in the Third World,
the present status of the world economy can therefore be characterized
as a polycentric order. 13 In the competition between these regions only
those enterprises can survive that are able to strengthen their technolog-
ical and managerial capacities. 14 Shorter product life cycles and fierce
competition in research and development between all nations are prereq.-
uisites to larger market potentials. The increasing importance of capital-
intensive technologies and the high speed of technological evolution cause
high expenditures for the enterprises involved and compel the manage-
ment to optimize the use of their entrepreneurial capacities.1 5 As a con-
sequence only a contemporaneous worldwide market penetration is able
to secure the required cost efficiencies. Otherwise the high start-up and
operating costs for the modernization and the restructuring of factories,
for research and development centers, and for the marketing force would
not be sustainable. National markets are in many cases too small for the
amortization of the costs of investment in rapidly changing technologies. 16
B. THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STRATEGY
Each entrepreneurial strategy provides at first the development and the
use of exclusive capacities and the strengthening of this competitive ad-
vantage over other competitors. These advantages may exist in technol-
ogy, in organizational and managerial know-how, in innovative capacities,
or in product differentiation.17 They may also be a consequence of the
fact that affiliates of transnational corporations can use worldwide re-
sources and the experience of the enterprise as a whole. In a second step
a decision has to be made whether these core skills should be internalized
by way of direct investment or externalized by way of cooperation with
other independent enterprises.
The traditional forms of crossborder resource transfer are trade and
foreign direct investment. The market economic approach to alleviate the
present problems in the world economy involves expanded use of various
forms of international transactions, which enable to a large extent a global
cooperation, a new sharing of investment risks, control, responsibility,
13. Boerner, Wie kann die schweizerische Wirtschaft im weltweiten Konkurrenzkampf
bestehen?, NZZ No. 176, Aug. 2-3, 1986, at 30; K. OHMAE, MACHT DER TRIADE, DIE NEUE
FORM WELTWEITEN WETTBEWERBS 5 (1985).
14. Boerner, supra note 13, at 30.
15. K. OHMAE, supra note 13, at 13, 14, 19, 20; Seelig, Begruessungsansprache, in
KAPITALINVESTITIONEN IM AUSLAND-CHANCEN UND RISIKEN 31 (J. Esser & K. Meessen
eds. 1984).
16. C. EBENROTH, supra note 11, 2.
17. Dunning, Explaining Changing Patterns of International Production: In Defense of
the Eclectic Theory, 41 OXFORD BUL. ECON. & STAT. 269-74 (1979).
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and profits as well as a combination of the transfer of capital, technology,
and goods. Such forms of international investment include, for example,
licensing contracts, subcontracting, consulting contracts, cooperation
contracts, and joint ventures. Also important is innovative export fi-
nancing such as barter trade, compensation contracts, contract packages,
turnkey, and repurchase contracts. These broadened forms of interna-
tionalization are appropriate to reduce the transaction costs of the cross-
border resource transfer. Growing forms of protectionism support internal
transfers inside a transnational corporation network instead of external
resource transfers between unrelated parties.' 8
The question of whether internalization or externalization is more suit-
able for the enterprise concerned can only be answered with respect to
the relevant local market. Determining this factor is the third step in the
entrepreneurial strategy. The enterprise intends to find the best possible
combination between its own entrepreneurial advantages and the local-
specific advantages of the host country. 19 In this respect the size of the
relevant market, the competition, and the degree of regulation are of
specific importance.20
C. THE HOST COUNTRY STRATEGY
From the viewpoint of the host country the choice between external
transfers of resources (between two unrelated parties) and internal ones
(inside transnational corporations) depends on its own entrepreneurial
capacity to use the resources. External transfers between unrelated par-
ties are only favorable if the recipient in the host country is in a position
to use the transferred object in an optimal way. If the transfer is financed
through the international money markets, the products should be inter-
nationally competitive to earn hard currency.2 Most of the developing
countries need, therefore, a marketing and distribution network in the
global market to achieve their plans of gaining financing facilities to repay
their debts.
Many developing countries have protected their domestic industry by
high tariffs against foreign competitors. This artificial situation did not
18. See the "Industrial Economics Approach" in Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 1937
ECONOMICA 386.
19. Dunning, Trade, Location of Economic Activity and the MNE: A Search for an
Eclectic Approach, in THE INTERNATIONAL ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF A NOBEL SYMPOSIUM HELD AT STOCKHOLM 395-99 (Ohlin, Hesselborn &
Wijkman eds. 1977).
20. Boerner, supra note 13, at 30.
21. J. KARL, WIRTSCHAFTLICHE BESTIMMUNGSGRUENDE UND RECHTLICHE GESTAL-
TUNGSMOEGLICHKEITEN FUER DEN EXTERNEN ODER INTERNEN RESSOURCENTRANSFER AUS
DER SICHT DES EMPFAENGERLANDES 17-32 (1986).
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force the entrepreneurs to adapt their industry to world market compe-
tition standards. 22 Today the LDCs are mainly successful in industrial
sectors with a low technological profile, for example the leather, shoe,
steel, textile, machinery, and electric industries.2 3 In addition, capital-
intensive technologies, in which the production technique is mainly stan-
dardized and does not sustain considerable electronic developments, are
sectors where these countries have advantages. 24 By contrast, in the high
technology industries only foreign direct investment can lead to a suc-
cessful position in the world market, because it is based on specific know-
how in research and development as well as on important financial and
managerial capacities. 25 Moreover, the investor bears the risk to amortize
his investment.
While considering the export chances of LDCs one must not forget the
existence today in the industrialized countries of strong neo-protectionist
forces. Technological progress leads to a painful process of economic
structure adaptation. The high rate of unemployment and the social unrest
bring entrepreneurs and trade unions together in support of the imple-
mentation of import quotas and other protectionist remedies to salvage
the domestic industry.26
Many countries in times of a constantly growing economic adjustment
process prefer to implement neo-protectionist measures, unwilling to ac-
cept that they cannot thereby protect these failing industries against in-
ternational competition. They support ideas of free world trade and
globalization only if their benefits can be shown for their own industry.
Politicians tend to look only to the next election and sometimes cannot
stand firm against requests from trade unions and entrepreneurs for pro-
tectionism. For example, the European Community regulates and subsi-
dizes the production and the marketing of agricultural products, subsidizes
the price of export goods, and impedes imports. The same is true for the
coal, steel, and textile markets.27
Such a policy cannot be successful in the long run. The promotion of
exports and the securing of foreign markets can only be achieved if the
recipient country has enough foreign exchange to finance its imports. The
recipient country must therefore be in a position to sell its products in
foreign markets. 28 In this respect the world economy needs not a one-
22. Id. at 23.
23. See C. POLLACK & J. RIEDEL, INDUSTRIEKOOPERATION MIT SCHWELLENLAENDERN
105 (1984).
24. See UN-CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 7, 33, 133, 157, 179 (3d ed. 1983).
25. J. KARL, suprii note 21, at 32-41.
26. C. EBENROTH, supra note 11, 2.
27. Id. 7-13.
28. Id. 14; Boerner, supra note 13, at 30.
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way national economic policy that encourages exports and impedes im-
ports. What we need is reciprocity for free world trade.
IV. The Impact of the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations for Foreign Direct Investment in LDCs
A. THE COMPETITION BETWEEN LDCs TO
ATTRACT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
A highly competitive market exists today for foreign direct investment.
In this market natural, economic, technological, political, and legal factors
of investment conditions can be distinguished, although it is not possible
to draw a clear line between these items. These investment conditions
together form the specific host country environment for a potential inves-
tor.29 Foreign direct investment will only take place if the host country
strategy and the entrepreneurial intentions are acting in unison. The inves-
tor will use the package of production factors only if it fits best with his
own entrepreneurial strategy compared with the investment conditions of
other competing host countries. 30 Except for legal factors, a host country
cannot change its investment environment in a short period of time. The
legal structure is, therefore, a key element to attract or to hinder foreign
direct investment. It enables the host country to compensate and to bal-
ance possible disadvantages of its natural, technological, political, or eco-
nomic investment conditions. The more unattractive its factor market for
foreign direct investment may be, the more it is obliged to impose legal
investment incentives to attract foreign investors. 31
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE
FORMATION OF THE LEGAL INVESTMENT CONDITIONS
1. The Investment Contract as a
Legal Framework for Investment
The main instrument for the regulation of foreign direct investment in
LDCs is increasingly the investment contract between the host country
and the foreign investor.32 In this contract the investor and the host coun-
try can optimize the specific aims of the investment. In that respect they
can minimize the investment risks and focus the contract on the economic
29. J. KARL, supra note 21, at 12-16.
30. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
31. C. EBENROTH, supra note II, 58.
32. Id. 1 74-79; P. FISCHER, DIE INTERNATIONALE KONZESSION 300 (1974); Waelde,
Transnationale Investitionsvertraege, 42 RABELSZ 28 (1978).
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development goals of the host country. The investment contract therefore
provides for the harmonization of the host country strategy with entre-
preneurial intentions. The traditional hierarchical model of investment
regulation is subsidized by a market-economy-oriented process of estab-
lishing a consensual determination of the specific investment conditions.
33
The principal aim of the investor is to gain appropriate profits and to
minimize his risks. The intention of the host countries is to make the
investment useful for the development of the domestic national economy.
34
One of the greatest problems in negotiating the terms and conditions
of the investment contract is to find common legal values acceptable to
both the host country and the investor. Most of the LDC legal systems
are not well adapted to international transactions. They were developed
for national transactions and the various conflict of laws rules and systems
do not facilitate the negotiation process for the final drafting of an in-
vestment contract. In international negotiations the choice of law is a
sensitive factor because one contracting party has to leave its own well-
known legal system. Other problems hamper the conclusion of an in-
vestment contract, such as the lack of relevant statutes, the lack of
information concerning existing legal norms, and the difficulty of making
the existing investment contract effective against a parent company
abroad. 35
2. The Function of the Draft Code of Conduct
a. Overview
An important attempt to overcome these difficulties is the United Na-
tions Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. 36 Other rel-
evant codes in this respect are the Tripartite Declaration of Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy by the International Labor Organization,
37
the UNCTAD "Set of Multilaterally Agreed Principles and Rules for the
Control of Restrictive Business Practices," 38 two special codes of lesser
importance concerning breast-milk substitutes 39 and the utilization of pes-
33. See M. SCHANZE, INVESTITIONSVERTRAEGE IM INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTS-
RECHT 34 (1986).
34. C. EBENROTH, supra note 11, 30; M. SCHANZE, supra note 33, at 43; Meessen, Auf
dem Wege zu einer neuen Weltwirtschaftsordnung? Versuch einer Standortbestimmung an-
hand des Entwurfes eines Verhaltenskodexfuer Transnationale Unternehmen, in ZIELSETZ-
UNG PARTNERSCHAFT, supra note 8, at 323-31.
35. C. EBENROTH, supra note II, 1 989.
36. The latest draft is dated June 2, 1985. See U.N. ESCOR Doc. E/C.10/1983/S/5.
37. Dated November 16, 1977, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 442 (1978).
38. Dated April 22, 1980, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 813 (1980).
39. Dated May 21, 1983, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1004 (1982).
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ticides, 40 and-last but not least-the UNCTAD Draft Code on the Trans-
fer of Technology. 41
These codes establish multilaterally approved investment standards on
the international level. They can therefore play an important role as a
"GATT for international investments." This is particularly true of the
Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. This code cor-
responds already in its structure to an investment contract in that it dis-
tinguishes in its two major parts between the duties of the investor and
those of the host country. 42 It deals with almost all relevant investment
topics: general and political questions; ownership and control; balance of
payments and financing; transfer pricing; taxation; competition and re-
strictive business practices; transfer of technology; consumer protection;
environmental protection; disclosure of information; nationalization and
compensation; and jurisdiction. Its intent is to create a fair balance be-
tween the at least partially different interests of the investor and the host
country. In the fields of labor law, transfer of technology, environmental
protection, consumer protection, and antitrust law it is complemented by
the above mentioned special codes and drafts.
b. The Draft Code and the Formation
of Investment Contracts
The Draft Code of Conduct builds a framework for the negotiations
between a foreign investor and the host country. It is designed to prevent
the unilateral favoring of one party due to the differences between the
legal systems of industrialized and developing countries. The Draft Code
contains in this respect guiding principles for the interpretation of inter-
national investment contracts. Moreover the Code creates an interna-
tionally accepted system for the consensual determination of the investment
conditions. 43
The guiding principles of the Draft Code show a different degree of
concretization and differentiation in their single components. According
to how intensively the particular topic is treated, the Code can either
offer a concrete model for the contractual fixing of the investment con-
ditions or present only the contractual scope for the final agreement. The
Draft Code of Conduct is in this respect a basis for the negotiation of
investment contracts under internationally accepted values.44 These prin-
40. Dated Nov. 26, 1985. See FAO-Doc. C 85/25-Rev. I.
41. The latest draft is dated June 5, 1985. See U.N.-Doc. TD/CODE TOT/47 dated June
20, 1985.
42. C. EBENROTH, supra note II, 328.
43. Id. 80.
44. Id. 81, 82.
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ciples are the starting-point for further specifications of the investment
conditions. Moreover they address themselves to the transnational cor-
poration as a whole and preclude the danger resulting from the fact that
the national legal order can only be made effective within a developing
country's own territory.45
c. The Influence of the Draft Code of Conduct in
Alleviating the Debt Crisis
The UN Draft Code of Conduct also has influence on the macroeco-
nomic level. In facilitating foreign direct investment its intent is to improve
the investment climate in LDCs and to strengthen free world trade. In
this respect it plays an important role for the necessary increase of foreign
direct investment in debtor countries envisaged by the Baker Plan. 46 This
is true even if a final agreement on all provisions of the Code cannot be
achieved.
V. Summary
After a phase of repression in the 1970s foreign direct investment is
regaining importance for the developing countries. The LDCs have rec-
ognized that risk capital can help them to overcome their serious financial
problems and to reduce the technological disparity with the industrialized
countries. Today developing countries are competing for foreign direct
investment. In this competition those host countries will have the best
chances whose local investment conditions fit best with the entrepreneu-
rial strategy. The investment conditions of the host country can be sep-
arated into natural, technological, economic, political, and legal elements.
Of special importance are the legal investment conditions because they
alone can be created and modified within a short period of time. These
conditions must fulfill the difficult task of harmonizing the investor's in-
terest in minimizing investment risks and achieving appropriate profits
with the host countries' aim to make the investment as useful as possible
for the domestic economy. The UN Draft Code of Conduct is by its
structure and its content able to support this process and can therefore
serve as a guide for the creation and interpretation of an investment
contract between a host country and an investor.
45. See H. GATTIKER, BEHANDLUNG UND ROLLE VON AUSLANDSINVESTITIONEN IM
MODERNEN VOELKERRECHT: EINE STANDORTBESTIMMUNG, SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH
FUER INTERNATIONALES RECHT 58 (1981).
46. C. EBENROTH, supra note I1, 1 108-121.
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